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quities.50 Horstmann, despite its inconsistency in theory and valuation
method, has taken the first step toward this goal in ruling that a spouse's
potential earning capacity acquired during marriage with the aid of the
other spouse's efforts is a marital asset subject to property division upon
dissolution.
ROBERT E. PINNELL

LANDLORD'S LIABILITY FOR
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES UNDER AN
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
Henderson v. W. C. Haas Realty Management, Inc.I
On October 10, 1971, a fire ravaged the Monticello Manor apartments
in Overland Park, Kansas. 2 Evidence showed that the fire was started by a
defect in the electrical wiring in the inter-ceiling space above a common
area in the basement. 3 Tenants in the apartment building sued the owners
and manager of the building for property damage and personal injury on a
theory of implied warranty of habitability. 4 After a jury verdict for plain50. In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (Colo. 1978) (Carrigan, J.,
dissenting).
1. 561 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
2. The fire occurred in Kansas, but the case was tried in a Missouri court.
By Missouri conflict of laws cases, Kansas law should have been applied. See Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. En Banc 1969). Therefore, it is possible that
this case is not precedent in Missouri, but an argument can be made for the opposite result. It is not clear from the opinion of the court of appeals that Kansas
law was applied. While the court does make reference to Kansas law, it looks to
several Missouri cases in reaching its decision. Even if this case is not precedent in
Missouri, it can serve as a starting point for any consideration of an action for

damages from a breach of the implied warranty of habitability between a
landlord and tenant because Missouri has adopted such an implied warranty. See
notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text infra.
3. The court held that circumstantial evidence could be used to infer the
origin of the fire and the existence of a defect. The evidence showed that, while
the cause of the fire was unknown, the fire began in the basement inter-ceiling
area. The fire chief testified that, of the water pipes, vent pipes, and electric wires
running through this area in the all-electric building, the electric wiring was the
most likely to start a fire. The court found this evidence sufficient for the jury to
infer that the fire started in the inter-ceiling area and that it was caused by some
defect in the electrical wiring. See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 16.03(4)(b)(i) (1977); 35 AM.JUR. 2d Fires § 56 (1967).

4. Missouri's cause of action for a breach of an implied warranty of
habitability has been limited so far to residential leases. See note 12 infra.
Therefore, this Note will deal only with implied warranties in residential leases.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 8
1979]

RECENT CASES

5
tiffs, the trial court entered a judgment n.o.v. for defendants. The appeals court affirmed. The court of appeals recognized that a landlord6
tenant warranty of habitability exists in present law. However, the court
7
held that to recover for consequential damages due to a breach of this
warranty, actual or constructive notice of the defect on the part of the

landlord was necessary and that this element was not shown.

8

Recognition of an implied warranty of habitability in landlord-tenant
law is a recent development and is still in a state of judicial transition. The
Henderson decision is significant because it deals with the issue of the
recovery of consequential damages under the implied warranty of
habitability. This problem has not been previously discussed by Missouri
9
courts and has been dealt with by only a few other jurisdictions. Missouri
first adopted the theory of implied warranty of habitability in Smith v. Old
Warson Development Co., 10 which involved the sale of a new house by the
builder-vendor; shortly thereafter Missouri adopted a warranty of
1
habitability between a landlord and tenant in King v. Moorehead. Ap5. The jury awarded three tenants a total of $30,116 in property damages
and awarded one tenant $2,000 for personal injuries. However, the trial court
sustained a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts and entered judgmentfor the defendants. Hendersonv. W.C. Haas Realty Mgt., Inc., 561 S.W.2d
382, 383 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
6. 561 S.W.2d at 385.
7. The Henderson court did not label the damages being sued for in this
case as consequential damages. However, it is clear that the recoveries sought
here (personal injury and property damages) were of such a nature. See 22 AM.
JUR. 2d Damages§ 56 (1965).
8. Henderson v. W.C. Haas Realty Mgt., Inc., 561 S.W.2d 382, 388 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1977).
9. Implied warranty was adopted with residential leases to shift the burden
of repair onto the landlord. See King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 71 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1973). It was only a matter of time until plaintiffs tried to sue for
damages to person and property resulting from an unfit condition in a leased
apartment as consequential damages from a breach of the implied warranty.
Several courts have now been confronted with this problem. See Dapkunas v.
Cagle, 42 Ill. App. 3d 644, 356 N.E.2d 575 (1976) (avoided the issue by finding
that the implied warranty was not applicable); Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford,
349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App. 1976) (allowed recovery under warranty because the
landlord had actual or constructive notice and adopted a negligence standard for
landlords); Dwyer v. Skyline Apts., Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (1973)
(reversed a trial court holding that found the landlord strictly liable).
10. 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. En Banc 1972), noted in 38 Mo. L. REV. 315
(1973). While there is some difference between this sales relationship and the
relationship between landlord and tenant, the court in King v. Moorehead, 495
S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973) (the Missouri decision first adopting an implied warranty of habitability between landlord and tenant), saw an analogy with
this warranty when discussing landlord-tenant warranty. The court inHenderson
used the notice requirement that had been found necessary in vendor-vendee implied warranties of habitability. Also, as stated in King, the acceptance of implied
warranty with landlord-tenant is premised on deeming the lease analagous to a
sale. Id. at 71.
11. 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973), noted in 39 Mo. L. REv. 56
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/8
(1974).
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plication of implied warranty law to residential1 2 leases is based on rejecting the applicability of caveat emptor and on viewing the lease as creating
a contractual relationship between the landlord and tenant.1 3 Contract
law can provide broad remedies, including damages, reformation, and
rescission.' 4 Under prior law, the tenant had recourse only under the doctrine of constructive eviction, which required vacation of the premises. '5
In Henderson, the court further expanded contractual' 6 remedies to include consequential damages under certain limited conditions.
To determine the nature of this expanded cause of action it is helpful

to look at the scope of the warranty. Both King" and Henderson'8 pictured the warranty as containing two parts. The landlord warrants that
the dwelling is habitable and fit for living at the inception of the term and
that it will remain so during the entire term. 19 The facts of the Henderson
12. King limited its implied warranty cause of action to residential leases.
Accord, Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Steele
v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276
A.2d 248 (1971). Contra, Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 NJ. 444, 251 A.2d
268 (1969) (action allowed where premises used for commercial offices).
13. Much has been written on the history and development of implied warranty between landlord and tenant. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428
F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Old Town Dev. Co. v.
Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind.App. 1976); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65
(Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973); Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises:
Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975 WIs. L. REv. 19, 23-31

(1975).
14. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 75-76 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
15. Id. at 70.
16. There are several Missouri cases which question whether an action
brought under implied warranty of habitability for consequential damages is
contractual or tortious in nature. With a contract action subsequent notice of
breach to the landlord may be necessary, and there is the possibility of disclaimer.
See note 62 and accompanying text infra. The products liability case of Keener v.
Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969), recognized the tort nature of
the liability imposed under an implied warranty. Warranty developed as a tort
concept, both historically and theoretically. See Krauskopf, ProductsLiability,
32 Mo. L. REV. 459, 463 (1967). In Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879
(Mo. En Banc 1978) (refusing to extend liability in the sale of a house from the
builder-vendor to a second purchaser), the Missouri Supreme Court discussed the
"confusion" in Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. En Banc
1972) (the Missouri case which adopted an implied warranty between the buildervendor and the first purchaser), concerning whether the liability of the buildervendor to the first purchaser was in contract or tort. The court determined that in
Old Warson the implied warranty was contractual because the plaintiff was suing
for mere deterioration or loss of bargain resulting from latent structural defects.
The present discussion, in contrast, deals with personal and property damage and
at least is arguably a form of tort liability.
17. 495 S.W.2d at 75.
18. 561 S.W.2d at 387.
495 S.W.2d
Kingofv.Law
Moorehead,
Id. at
387. SeeSchool
Published by19.
University
of Missouri
Scholarship Repository,
1979 65 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1973).
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case, as well as the holding and the discussion of the court, fall within the
first part of the warranty- that the dwelling is fit at the beginning of the
lease. Consequently, this Note will concern itself primarily with the
elements of a cause of action brought under the first portion of the warranty. There are separate considerations for whether the same elements also
apply to a suit brought on the second part of the warranty- that the dwelling remain fit for the remainder of the term. These considerations are
20
discussed later in this Note.
The first element necessary to recovery for a breach of the first portion
of the warranty is the existence of a defect. The King court defined a
defect as any material breach of an applicable housing code. 2' The
Henderson court instead defined a defect as a condition rendering the
premises uninhabitable for residential purposes. 22 Apparently the
Hendersonstandard should be used exclusively in actions for consequen23
tial damages.
Henderson further implied that any defect in existence at the time of
the lease must be latent for the award of consequential damages which
arise from the defect. 24 The court quoted from both Mease v. Fox 25 and
Old Town Development Co. v. Langford26 to the effect that the landlord
20. See text accompanying notes 63-71 infra.
21. 495 S.W.2d at 75. The court listed the following as factors affecting
materiality of a breach: the nature of the deficiency or defect, its effect on the
life, health, or safety of the tenants, the length of time it has persisted, and the
age of the structure. Id. at 76.
22. 561 S.W.2d at 387. This standard is similar to the "constructive eviction
test" where substantial interference with possession or enjoyment is required. See
Yaffe v. American Fixture, Inc., 345 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Mo. 1961). Both of these
standards are widely used and one authority has stated that each has an advantage for the tenant. The housing code is a more certain standard, while the
reasonably fit standard provides more protection for the tenant. See Love, supra
note 13, at 101.
23. This conclusion is based on the assumption that King applies to tenants
who withhold rent and Henderson applies to actions for consequential damages.
Another possible conclusion is that the Henderson court used the uninhabitable
definition because it thought this was the defintion that Kansas would use. See
note 2 supra. But cf. Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974) (adopting a warranty based at least in part on a housing code).
24. The same latency requirement may not apply to defects which arise during the course of the leasehold. See text accompanying notes 65-67 infra. The
defect is also not necessarily latent in an action such as that contemplated in King
v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973), where knowledge of the
defect would seem to be always present when the defect is used as a basis for
withholding rent.
25. 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972) (adopting an implied warranty of
habitability for residential leases in Iowa where the landlord did not repair
various housing code violations of which he had been notified).
26. 349 N.E.2d 744, 774 (Ind. App. 1976) (holding in a 51 page opinion
that a builder-lessor was liable for damages from a fire caused by a wooden joist
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/8
being too close to a furnace flue vent, under both negligence theory and implied
warranty of habitability theory).
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warrants against latent defects at the time of the lease. Missouri courts
have defined latent defect in a landlord-tenant situation as meaning one
27
which the tenant could not discover on a reasonably careful inspection.
Limiting the landlord's warranty in this way could preclude relief for a tenant who has knowledge of the defect but has no real alternative to taking
the defective housing and does not have the funds necessary to correct the
defect himself. Still, this limiting requirement is consistent with implied
warranty under the UCC 28 and with traditional tort law governing lawsuits
29
arising out of the landlord-tenant relationship.
Another necessary element for recovery is the landlord's prior notice or
knowledge of the defect. 30 The Henderson court derived this requirement
from two sources. First, it pointed out (with possibly suspect authority)
that implied warranty cases involving the sale of new houses have imposed
this requirement. 3 ' Second, the court cited Old Town in which this notice
requirement was seen as permeating discussions of the nature of a breach
of an implied warranty of habitability.3 2 Old Town recognized that this requirement of notice reflected a continued unwillingness to adopt strict
33
liability for the landlord.
27. Logsdon v. Central Dev. Ass'n, 223 Mo. App. 499, 508, 123 S.W.2d
631, 636 (K.C. 1938). Accord, Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 454,
251 A.2d 268, 273 (1969). For a similar Missouri holding in a products liability
case, see Edwards v. Springfield Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 495 S.W.2d 489, 497
(Mo. App., D. Spr. 1973).
28. RSMO § 400.2-316(3)(b) (1969) (U.C.C.) provides: "[W]hen the buyer
before entering into the contract has examined the goods... as fully as he desired
or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to
defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to
him...."
29. See text accompanying note 57 infra.
30. Henderson v. W.C. Haas Realty Mgt., Inc., 561 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1977). The court says the landlord can have either notice or
knowledge of the defect; it often appears the court is using the terms interchangeably. This case involved circumstantial evidence pointing to a fire caused
by wiring concealed by the walls and ceiling. The court did not find such notice or
knowledge present, stating "[T]here is no evidence in this case of any notice of any
kind of the defective condition of the wiring in the basement common area ....
Id. at 388.
31. Id. at 387. The court cited, among others, the case of Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. En Banc 1972). In this case the Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed the St. Louis District Court of Appeals in finding such a
warranty by a new home developer. They added to the appeals court rationale, in
what may have been dicta, a requirement of notice of the defect on the part of the
developer. Subsequently, in Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 882 n.5
(Mo. En Banc 1978), the Missouri Supreme Court quoted and apparently relied
upon a passage from the appeals court opinion in Old Warson which indicated
that there was not a requirement of notice.
32. See Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 774 (Ind. App.
1976).
33. Id.ofatMissouri
775. ItSchool
Published by University
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The landlord's knowledge can be either actual or constructive. 34 Actual knowlege can either be of the defect itself or of circumstances from
which the defect may be inferred.3 5 A builder-lessor has notice if a
reasonable inspection would have disclosed the defect.3 6 Language quoted
by the Henderson court goes further and suggests that a builder-landlord
is "presumed to have knowledge of any latent defects in the original construction of the building. 37 The court in Old Town stated that some
jurisdictions also presume constructive notice from the landlord's prior
possession of the premises.3 8 The Henderson court implicitly rejected this
analysis. Old Town also suggested that constructive notice can evolve from
a landlord's right to inspect which is concomitant with the implied duty to
repair, the second part of the landlord's implied warranty.3 9 No authority
has been found suggesting that an implied warranty of habitability involves a duty of inspection for the landlord prior to each leasing. Absent
such authority, it must be assumed that such a duty has not been created.
The Henderson court seems to expand a tenant's rights when it states
that recovery for consequential damages will be allowed when there is
damage arising from a latent defect, in existence at the time of the lease, of
which the landlord has actual or constructive notice or knowledge.
However, a comparison of this remedy with the landlord's already existing
liability in tort is necessary in order to determine when the landlord's exposure to liability will be increased.
The general common law rule has been that the landlord is not liable
to the tenant in tort. The lease was viewed as a conveyance of land with
an analogy with products liability. The landlord is pictured as selling a shelter for
a specified period of time. It is argued that the landlord has a greater ability to inspect and repair the premises than does the average urban dweller. Also, emphasis is placed on the landlord's superior position to bear and distribute the risk..
See Love, supra note 13; Note, Landlord and Tenant-Products LiabilityLandlord'sImplied Warranty of HabitabilityDoes Not Give Rise To Strict Tort
Liability For Tenant's Personal Injuries, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 409 (1974);
Note, Products Liability at the Threshold of the Landlord-Leosor, 21 HASTINGS
L.J. 458 (1970).
34. Henderson v. W.C. Haas Realty Mgt., Inc., 561 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1977).
35. Holmes v. Doe Run Lead Co., 223 S.W. 772, 779 (St. L. Mo. App.
1920). Accord, Farmers Mut. Royalty Syn. v. Isaacks, 138 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Tex.
App. 1940). See also 66 C.J.S. Notice § 7 (1950).
36. This conclusion is reached by analogy to Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co.,
479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. En Banc 1972), where the builder-vendor was held to have
such notice. This conclusion is also the holding in Old Town Dev. Co. v.
Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App. 1976).
37. 561 S.W.2d at 387. It is questionable whether the court meant this
passage to be read in such broad terms. As such it imposes strict liability and is inconsistent with Old Warson.
38. 349 N.E.2d at 775.
39. Id. at 775 n.36. For a discussion of the second part of the implied warhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/8
ranty of habitability, see text accompanying notes 63-71 infra.
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caveat emptor applying. 40 Missouri courts have recognized five exceptions
to this harsh rule. Liability may be imposed when the premises are leased
for public use, 41 when hidden defects exist at the time of the lease and are
known to the landlord, 42 when areas are retained by the landlord for common use, 43 when the landlord makes repairs negligently, 44 or when a covenant to repair exists along with some other indication of the landlord's control.

45

At least two courts have held that adopting an implied warranty is inconsistent with a continuation of such tort immunity. 46 They took the position that adopting an implied warranty discarded caveat emptor, the legal
foundation and justification for the landlord's immunity in tort. 47 The
Henderson court gave no indication that it considered this possible implication of adopting implied warranty. Assuming, therefore, that
Missouri still follows the general rule of landlord tort immunity with its exceptions, the limited recovery Henderson acknowledged in contractpotentially increases the situations where the landlord will be liable. The
Henderson court dealt particularly with the part of the implied warranty
that concerns defects existing at the time of the lease, 48 and which required
both that the defect be latent and that the landlord have actual or constructive knowledge of such a latent defect. Such a cause of action appears
very similar to liability based on the hidden defect exception to tort immunity. 49 A comparison of these two actions indicates that the landlord's
liability may not have been significantly expanded.
40. See 52 CJ.S. Landlord and Tenant § 417(3)(a) (1968).
41. See Noel v. Buchholz, 411 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. 1967); Warner v. Fry, 360
Mo. 496, 228 S.W.2d 729 (1950).
42. See Reckert v. Roco Petroleum Corp., 411 S.W.2d 199 (Mo. 1966);
Hampton v. Loper, 402 S.W.2d 825 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966); Flournoy v. Kuhn,
378 S.W.2d 264 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
43. See Fitzpatrick v. Ford, 372 S.W.2d 844 (Mo. 1963); Woods v. Gould,
515 S.W.2d 592 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968).
44. See Fitzpatrick v. Ford, 372 S.W.2d 844 (Mo. 1963); Stewart v. Zuellig,
336 S.W.2d 399 (Mo. 1960).
45. Lemm v. Gould, 425 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1968); Tucker v. Taksel, 345
S.W.2d 385 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961).
46. Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App. 1976);
Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973). Landlord's tort immunity
has also been denied in California but on the basis of statutory construction
rather than the adoption of implied warranty. Brennan v. Cockrell Inv., Inc., 35
Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1973).
47. Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 760 (Ind. App.
1976); Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 397, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973).
48. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
49. See note 42 and accompanying text supra. If an action fits the common
use exception (see note 43 and accompanying text supra) it might be pleaded as

such because there is then no need to prove that the defect was latent. The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 360 (1965), which is recognized as Missouri
law in Rawson v. Ellerbrake, 423 S.W.2d 14, 15-16 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967), states
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In Reckert v. Roco Petroleum Corp.5 0 the Missouri Court of Appeals
outlined the elements of the hidden defect exception. 5' The first of the
court's four requirements is the existence of a dangerous condition with
unreasonable risk at the time of the lease.5 2 Such a condition is similar to
the defect necessary under the first part of the implied warranty. A defect
under implied warranty of habitability is either a material breach of a
housing code provision or an unreasonably unfit condition.5 3 A defect
might exist which is not a dangerous condition posing an unreasonable
risk, but it is unlikely that such a defect would cause personal injury or property damage. Conversely, any leased property with a dangerous condition
with unreasonable risk is not reasonably fit.
The court's second requirement is that at the time of the lease the
defect is known to the landlord. 54 This requisite is satisfied by knowledge
of facts from which he ought to have known that a defect exists.5 5This tort
requirement seems similar to implied warranty's demand of actual or constructive notice on the part of the landlord.56
The third tort requirement is that the defect must "not [be] known to
the tenant and not discoverable by the tenant in the exercise of ordinary
care." 5 This too is requisite in the need to prove a latent defect as an element of an implied warranty action.
tributory fault on his part. It would seem that the same reasoning could be
applied to the tort exception based on negligent repairs. See note 44 and accompanying text supra. There must be a negligent repair, but it would seem the tenant's knowledge would be important for contributory fault. However, comment
(d) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 362 (1965) (which has not been

adopted in Missouri) says the tenant cannot recover if he knew or was in a position
such that he should have known of the negligent repair. The public use exception
(see note 41 and accompanying text supra) need not be considered as a possible
alternative to an implied warranty action as it would not be appropriate to use
this exception to make the landlord liable for injury in residential leased premises
as such premises are not open to the public. For a discussion of the covenant to
repair tort exception, see text accompanying notes 67-71 infra.
50. 411 S.W.2d 199 (Mo. 1966).
51. The court stated:
This general rule [of landlord immunity] is subject to an exception
where at the time the lease is executed there is a dangerous condition of
the premises involving unreasonble risk of physical harm to persons on
the premises, which is known to the landlord and not known to the tenant and not discoverable by the tenant in the exercise of ordinary care.
In such case there is a duty on the landlord to disclose to the tenant the
existence of the dangerous condition. ...
Id. at 205.
52. Id. at 205.
53. See text accompanying notes 21 & 22 supra.
54. Reckert v. Roco Petroleum Corp., 411 S.W.2d 199, 205 (Mo. 1966).
55. Id. at 205.
56. The implied warranty liability could be more onerous if the landlord
were under an affirmative duty to inspect the premises prior to leasing them. See
text accompanying note 39 supra.
57. Reckert v. Roco Petroleum Corp., 411 S.W.2d 199, 205 (Mo. 1966).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/8
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The fourth requirement in Reckert is that the landlord has a duty only
to disclose the defect.58 It is at least arguable that such disclosure is no
longer sufficient to prevent the landlord's liability for consequential
damages under the first part of an implied warranty of habitability.
Disclosure precludes liability under the hidden defect exception because
the exception was originally based on the concept of fraudulent concealment on the part of the landlord.5 9 If the tenant knew of the defect there
was no fraud. This reasoning is inappropriate with implied warranty
because the warranty is not based on fraud. Without such a base, it seems
unfair to allow the landlord to escape liability by merely pointing out any
latent defects of which he is aware. The argument can be made that when
the landlord tells the tenant about a defect prior to leasing, the defect is no
longer latent and a necessary element for consequential damages from a
breach of an implied warranty does not exist. This position can be justified
by arguing that when the tenant uses leased premises knowing about a
defect, any injury proximately results from his action rather than from a
breach of the warranty. 60 Hence, mere disclosure prior to leasing could
vitiate the breach. Henderson gave no clear indication whether the
landlord now has a duty to do more than disclose the defect to the tenant at
61
the time the lease is made.

By the above analysis, it seems that when the defect existed at the time
of the lease there is significant substantive similarity between bringing an
action under breach of implied warranty of habitability and bringing it
under the hidden defect exception to tort immunity. The two possible major differences, whether a landlord has a duty under implied warranty to
inspect prior to leasing and whether the landlord must do more than
disclose the defect under implied warranty, must await clarification by the
courts.
There may be one further difference in bringing such a cause of action
in contract rather than in tort. By analogy to the UCC the courts may
and lack of
determine that the landlord gains the defenses of disclaimer
62
subsequent notice if the action is brought in contract.
There is also a second part of the implied warranty of habitability: 63 a
warranty that the apartment will remain fit for the entire period of the
lease. The court points out that this warranty necessarily involves an im58. Id. at 205.
59. Logsdon v. Central Dev. Ass'n, 233 Mo. App. 499, 506-07, 123 S.W.2d
631, 636 (K.C. 1938), overruled, Bartlett v. Taylor, 351 Mo. 1060, 174 S.W.2d
844 (1943).
60. See RSMO § 400.2-316, comment 8 (1969) (U.C.C.).
61. Landlord's liability might still exist even after such disclosure due to the
implied duty to repair under the second part of the implied warranty of
habitability. See text accompanying notes 63-71 infra.

62.

See RSMO §§ 400.2-316, .2-607(3)(a) (1969) (U.C.C.).
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plied duty to repair.64 If it is assumed that the holding in Henderson applies to this portion of the implied warranty then the defect must be
latent 65 and the landlord must have notice or knowledge of it. However, it
seems unlikely that the requirement of latency is part of an implied duty to
repair. First, the court's two statements of the warranty in Henderson
mention "latent" only in terms of the condition of the premises upon letting.6 6 Second, including the latency requirement would allow the
landlord only to give notice to the tenant rather than to repair the defect.
Third, the requirement ignores that the landlord typically has a greater
ability to make repairs and that it is the landlord's property being improved.
If latency of the defect is not necessary to collect consequential
damages for a breach of the duty to repair under an implied warranty of
habitability, there are several forms which such a cause of action could
take. The courts could require only the existence of a defect and
reasonable notice to the landlord. 67 The courts could choose to pattern the
action after the Missouri tort immunity exception that imposes liability
when there is a breach of a covenant to repair; this exception requires both
knowledge on the part of the landlord and some further indication of continued control over the premises. 68 The only advantage that an implied
warranty action would have is that there would not need to be an express
covenant as is required in the tort exception, because the implied warranty
would serve this function. As an alternative, a Missouri court could use the
implied warranty as an opportunity to broaden this exception to be in line
with the Restatement69 and a growing number of courts 70 by allowing
64. Henderson v. W.C. Haas Realty Mgt., Inc., 561 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1977).
65.This assumption is based on the fact that the court in Henderson first
found that the defect was latent. 561 S.W.2d at 387.
66.

Henderson v. W.C. Haas Realty Mgt., Inc., 561 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Mo.

App., D.K.C. 1977). Also, the fact situation in Henderson does not involve a
defect which arose after the lease.

67.

This is the Henderson holding without the latency requirement which

arguably should not exist for this branch of the warranty. See text following note
66 supra.
68. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 (1965) provides:

A lessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his lessee
and others upon the land with the consent of the lessee or his sublessee by

a condition of disrepair existing before or arising after the lessee has
taken possession if

(a) the lessor, as such, has contracted by a covenant in the lease or

otherwise to keep the land in repair, and
(b) the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk to persons upon the

land which the performance of the lessor's agreement would have
prevented, and

(c) the lessor fails to exercise reasonable care to perform his contract.
70. See Moldenhauer v. Krynski, 62 Ill. App. 2d 382, 210 N.E.2d 809
(1965); Williams v. Davis, 188 Kan. 385,362 P.2d 641 (1961); Zuroski v. Estate of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/8
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